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1 Introduction 
 
Up until the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)1 scandal broke in 2012, the 
global foreign exchange (FX) market was widely perceived to be sufficiently large, 
liquid and competitive to withstand successful attempts of manipulative or collusive 
practices. Indeed, with a daily turnover of $5.1 trillion (BIS, 2016) and immensely 
tight bid-ask spreads even during times of volatility and crisis, hardly any market 
could be seen as more competitive. In June 2013, this assumption was radically 
challenged in a Bloomberg article with the headline ‘Traders Said to Rig Currency 
Rates to Profit Off Clients’ (Vaughan, Finch and Choudhury, 2013). In November 
2014, six global banks were fined $4.3 billion in total for manipulative trading 
conduct in the FX markets (CTFC, 2014). Six months later, Bank of America, 
Barclays, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, RBS and UBS received fines of $5.6 billion in 
total for rigging the global FX markets. Transcripts made public by the regulators 
revealed that traders at large banks had been engaging in collusive practices in the 
global, and largely unregulated, FX spot market which, according to the FBI, involved 
criminality ‘on a massive scale’ (Chon, Binham and Noonan, 2015). In light of the 
revelation of widespread misconduct in relation to both interest rates and FX, the aim 
of this paper is to investigate the FX swap market – with particular emphasis on the 
competitive aspects of the bid-ask spread determination process.  
 
Surprisingly, although the FX swap market has been subject to similar changes in 
regulation and compliance following the events above, it has hitherto largely escaped 
thorough scrutiny by regulators, lawyers, academics and the media. The lack of 
‘interest’ in the FX swap market is surprising for three reasons. First, the market is 
enormous. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2016), FX 
swaps and forwards counts for 47% and 14% of the global FX turnover respectively. 
Second, the majority of the key market participants (i.e. banks and interdealer 
brokers) are almost identical to those caught up in the LIBOR and FX scandals. 
Importantly, FX swaps play a dual role in the financial markets, by being integrated 
into the FX market as well as the interest rate market. As an FX swap involves an FX 
                                                
1 List of abbreviations: London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), foreign exchange (FX), over-the-
counter (OTC), Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR), Den Norske Bank (DNB), Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken (SEB), Danske Bank (DDB), Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR), fixed 
income, currency and commodity (FICC). 
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spot transaction with a simultaneous FX forward transaction in the opposite direction, 
an FX swap can also be seen as a loan in one currency versus a simultaneous deposit 
in another currency for the same maturity and with the same counterparty following 
the covered interest parity. 2 Given that the FX swap desks typically are located within 
close proximity of the FX spot and money market desks on the trading floors, they 
share similar conventions and ‘cultures’. Third, whereas other several money markets 
were extremely illiquid, completely frozen or not tradable per se (e.g. LIBOR) during 
the financial crisis of 2007-08, the FX swap market continued to function as a 
tradable funding instrument.  
 
However, the lack of scrutiny can also be logically explained. First, FX swaps have 
always received considerably less attention than other FX markets in the finance 
literature. Instead, FX swaps tend to be mentioned simply as components of 
something else (e.g. FX forwards, FX futures and currency options), or in the 
economics literature in relation to arbitrage (Akram, Rime and Sarno, 2008), the 
failure of arbitrage during times of stress (Baba and Packer, 2009; McGuire and von 
Peter, 2012) or interest rate parity conditions under balance sheet constraints 
(Ivashina, Scharfstein and Stein, 2015; Avdijev et al., 2016; Sushko et al., 2016). 
Second, the FX swap market has traditionally been less embracing of electronic 
trading platforms than the FX spot market. Consequently, given that actual transaction 
data is scarce, it could be argued that empirical studies using indicative (but available) 
quotes have few relevant insights to offer.  
 
This paper aims to break that tradition. As the LIBOR scandal has shown, even prices 
and numbers that are not tradable per se can have far-reaching implications on end-
users and submitters alike. For reputational, regulatory or legal reasons, no bank 
would like to come to realise that its screen submission process (whether involving 
tradable or indicative prices) had been used with the intent to manipulate or collude. 
Likewise, no bank would like to come to defend that its submission process (whether 
involving tradable or indicative prices) simply had followed a convention that was 
                                                
2 This is stated formally as: 1 + 𝑖!! = !!!"!!" (1 + 𝑖!!), where 𝑖!!  (𝑖!!) is the base (counter) currency 
interest rate for maturity t. 𝑆!"  (𝐹!!") represents the FX spot (FX forward) rate between the two 
currencies. According to the covered interest rate parity, interest rate differentials between two 
currencies should be reflected in the FX swap price (𝐹!!" −  𝑆!"). Otherwise, arbitrage would be 
possible.  
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based upon ‘what everyone else in the market had been doing’ or that no harm was 
intended by doing so.  
 
By empirically investigating the USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap markets, this 
paper critically reflects upon how the competition aspect of the FX swap bid-ask 
spread determination ought to be conceptualised. It is found that neither traditional 
market microstructure theory, where the bid-ask spread at the outset is assumed to be 
determined competitively, nor screening methodologies widely used by antitrust 
authorities to present evidence to the contrary (elements that could suggest anti-
competitive behaviour), offers satisfactory insights into how market makers behave in 
practice. Instead, the findings suggest that conventions are central to the bid-ask 
spread determination process in the FX swap market. Whereas this, at the outset, 
might be seen as contradictory from a theoretical perspective, it highlights important 
complexities and the multifaceted nature of market making in over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets.  
  
Thus, this paper not only introduces FX swaps to market microstructure theory but 
also adds a ‘new’ financial instrument to the already vast literature on bid-ask spreads 
following the pioneering work by Demsetz (1968). Moreover, given that the starting 
point of the methodology is rooted in the antitrust literature, it specifically contributes 
to the recent and growing work on misconduct and manipulation by, and regulation 
of, market makers and liquidity providers in the interbank money markets (Abrantes-
Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas, 2011; Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012; Stenfors, 2014a; 
Duffie and Stein, 2015), the stock markets (Cumming, Johan and Li, 2011) and the 
FX markets (Evans, 2014). 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature on bid-ask spread determination. Section 3 outlines the data and 
methodology used in the paper. Section 4 summarises the empirical results. In Section 
5, the results are then analysed and discussed in terms of whether the bid-ask spread 
could be said to be determined competitively, anti-competitively or following a 
convention. Section 6 concludes and reflects upon the implications for policy makers 
and compliance departments in light of the recent investigations and reform proposals 
affecting the global FX and money markets. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
In market microstructure theory, market makers are assumed to quote two-way prices 
(in other words determine the bid-ask spread) competitively following the original 
Bertrand analysis. This process results in some kind of equilibrium bid-ask spread, 
which is as tight as possible. However, because the bid-ask spread must cover three 
types of costs (order processing costs, asymmetric information costs and inventory 
carrying costs), it is always greater than zero (Bessembinder, 1994; Stoll, 1989). The 
theoretical starting point is, therefore, a purely hypothetical mid-price, and the various 
costs can be seen as deviations from a perfect market. According to Demsetz (1968), 
the bid-ask spread is ‘the mark-up that is paid for immediacy of exchange in 
organised markets’. Hence, it can be seen as compensation paid to market makers for 
standing ready to absorb the risk borne by others ‘immediately’. Consequently, the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread is closely connected to the liquidity of the market (or 
the perceived future liquidity of it).  
 
Given its size, the global FX market presents itself as the ideal setting for the study of 
competitive processes. Indeed, previous studies on the FX spot market generally seem 
to confirm the logic above. The bid-ask spread has shown to be positively correlated 
with exchange rate volatility (Bassembinder, 1994; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; 
Glassman, 1987; Hartmann, 1998; Hua and Li, 2011). Spreads also tend to widen in 
thin markets, around specific events and ahead of weekends and holidays, because of 
higher inventory risk (Bassembinder 1994; Glassman 1987; Kaul and Sapp, 2006; 
Mende, 2006). However, empirical results are more mixed with regards to trading 
volume. On the one hand, bid-ask spreads tend to widen with trading activity, order 
size and quoting frequency, which are linked to greater uncertainty (Bollerslev and 
Domowitz, 1993; Glassman, 1987; Lyons, 1995; Melvin and Yin, 2000). On the other 
hand, Hartmann (1998) shows that the volume effect is negative in the long run. 
Naturally, transaction costs should be lower (and bid-ask spreads tighter) in large and 
liquid markets. In sum, the bid-ask spread can be seen as a proxy for market liquidity, 
an element that is ultimately determined by the trading volume, turnover and volatility 
in a competitive market.  
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However, when studies have involved a more detailed investigation into individually 
quoted prices, other patterns have often emerged. For instance, prices (and 
consequently also bid-ask spreads) have sometimes been shown to be coarsely 
“granulated” and “sticky”. The phenomenon that prices often tend to cluster around 
some numbers (such as 0 or 5) more frequently than others (such as 7 or 8) has also 
been shown to be prevalent in financial markets, such as FX spot (Goodhart and 
Curcio, 1991), bond futures (Gwilym, Clare and Thomas, 1998) and bank deposits 
(Kahn, Pannachi and Sopranzetti, 1999). A plausible psychological explanation for 
this behaviour, referred to as the ‘attraction hypothesis’ or the ‘round number effect’, 
might lie in the desire to look for approximate ‘anchors’ when exact precision might 
be difficult (Yule, 1927; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Another theory explaining 
such behaviour is the ‘price resolution hypothesis’. It has been shown that price 
clustering tends to vary inversely with the knowledge of the fundamental value of an 
asset (Ball et al., 1985). Consequently, thin, volatile and uncertain markets can force 
market participants to form some kind of grid, or price/spread matrix, in order to 
transact fast enough and to minimise negotiating costs. Although from different 
perspectives, these two theories imply that price clustering is natural, and sometimes a 
rational phenomenon arising from how individuals face decisions under uncertainty.  
 
Post-Keynesian economists (see, for instance, Harvey, 2009) go even further and tend 
to reject the idea of ‘fundamental drivers’ in the FX market. Instead, given a 
prevailing uncertainty about the future direction of the market prices are seen to be 
determined by whatever market participants expect the future drivers to be. As 
Keynes (1936, pp. 162-163) wrote: ‘human decisions affecting the future […] cannot 
depend on strict mathematical expectations since the basis for making such 
calculations does not exist’. However, uncertainty about the future does not need to 
result in chaos - because of the central role of conventions, or ‘that the existing state 
of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to 
expect a change’ (ibid, p. 152). Conventions allow expectations about the future, at 
least to a degree, to become harmonised and receive an orderly status. Conventions 
might, of course, change at any time. However, if they become attached to the daily 
trading routine or part of the institutional structure, the confidence in their relevance 
and validity increases (Carvalho, 1983-1984; Lawson, 1985). Indeed, according to 
Cheung and Wong (2000), having conducted a survey among 392 FX spot dealers in 
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Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo, 77,4%, 69.9% and 71.3% respectively cited the 
‘market convention’ as the main driver for choosing the interbank bid-ask spread. A 
similar study by Cheung and Chinn (2001) on 142 banks operating in the FX market 
in New York found that 69% argued in favour of the market convention, rather than 
potential costs, being the key determinant of the bid-ask spread.  
 
Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between auction markets (the starting point 
of the original bid-ask spread literature) and OTC markets to which the FX market 
belongs. The FX market relies on market-making banks quoting prices to end-users 
on demand, and to each other to maintain liquidity. Further, given that the FX swap 
market involves element of credit and funding liquidity risk, individually submitted 
bid-ask spreads might also depend on search mechanisms typical of OTC markets 
(Lamoureux and Schnitzlein, 1997) or the bargaining power of different market 
participants (Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2005). For instance, studies by Schultz 
(2001), Harris and Piwowar (2006) and Green, Hollifield and Schürhoff (2007) show 
that smaller investors face wider bid-ask spreads in some bond markets. Such two-tier 
markets have also been found to exist in the highly liquid EUR/USD FX spot market 
(Osler, Mende and Menkhoff, 2011). The observation that market makers might quote 
more competitive bid-ask spreads in larger amounts to informed traders (thus also 
competing market makers) contradicts the traditional market microstructure approach, 
where adverse selection would result in the exact opposite outcome. However, the 
existence of various degrees of market power could, of course, also be linked to issues 
related to abuse of such power. An explanation for anomalous price patterns could, 
therefore, be that of collusion: that market makers agree upon certain pre-determined 
bid-ask spreads. Potential collusion with regards to bid-ask spreads in financial 
markets was brought to light already two decades ago in two empirical studies by 
Christie and Schultz (1994ab) on NASDAQ stocks.  
 
Thus, the relevant literature shows that bid-ask spread determination is a multifaceted 
phenomenon, where authors generally approach the subject from one of three 
(sometimes overlapping) perspectives. Whereas behavioural patterns and biases often 
are incorporated within market microstructure theory, the starting point is that of a 
competitive market. The Post-Keynesian literature, on the other hand, is more inclined 
to stress the important of conventions, social norms and trust in price determination 
 8 
processes. Finally, authors touching upon anti-competitive aspects in the financial 
markets highlight elements of power, deception and, ultimately, collusive practices 
which could be unlawful. 
 
As the inspiration for this paper is drawn from the third strand, the logical 
methodological starting point is also based upon the underlying hypothesis that anti-
competitive practices could be prevalent within the FX swap bid-ask spread 
determination process – and that evidence supporting (but perhaps not proving) such 
claims are obtainable using publicly available data. At the same time, however, given 
the nature of OTC markets more generally, and particularly those highly dependent on 
reciprocal liquidity provision agreements, the theoretical distinction between (anti-
)competitive practises and conventions might be blurry – and therefore problematic 
from the perspective of regulators and policy makers. 
 
Although the academic literature provides little direct insight into potential collusive 
behaviour in the FX market (let alone bid-ask spreads in the FX swap markets), 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas (2011) show that an empirical screening 
methodology based upon Benford’s Law could have been applied to individual 
LIBOR submissions by banks – ultimately suggesting that collusive practices 
potentially could have been detected prior to the LIBOR scandal erupted in 2012. As 
the purpose of this paper is to seek to detect, and then to analyse and discuss, 
potentially anti-competitive practices in a market closely related to LIBOR, this is 
also the initial methodology used in this paper to examine the bid-ask spread 
determination process.  
 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The FX market is a decentralised quote-driven market. Market making banks quote 
prices to end-users upon request and to be able to do also quote prices to each other. 
The number of market makers generally differs (from a handful to several dozens) 
differs depending on the size of the market and generally includes a selection of the 
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large universal banks as well as the major domestic banks in the respective currency 
pair.  
 
Given that the FX market is largely unregulated, informal market conventions play an 
important role. These range from agreed-upon opening hours of the interbank market 
to standardised amounts and the number of seconds a firm price would be considered 
to be tradable. Although the FX swap market shares many of the characteristics of the 
FX spot market (which is of similar size), it also has some unique aspects. For 
instance, whereas end-users may request FX swap and FX forward prices for ‘broken 
dates’ in a range of possible currency pairs, market makers only tend to provide 
liquidity to each other in FX swaps only, for standardised maturities (1-month, 
3months, 6-months etc.) and in currencies against US dollars. Moreover, given the 
interest rate risk involved in the transactions, FX swaps are frequently hedged with or 
traded alongside OTC derivatives such as interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements 
and overnight index swaps.  
 
The average daily turnover in the FX swap market is $2.4 trillion, of which 74% is 
interbank. Other financial institutions (institutional investors, hedge funds etc.) make 
up another 19%. Although electronic trading gradually has become more common 
among all FX instruments, 45% of FX swaps are still voice-executed. Approximately 
20% of the volume is executed through voice brokers (BIS, 2016). Consequently, as 
they typically intermediate between banks only, brokers play a very important role in 
the price discovery process and the facilitation of liquidity for market marking banks. 
Being independent financial institutions and, in contrast to the market making banks, 
not holding any inventories, interdealer brokers compete in the FX swap market for 
commissions from banks. 
 
Two different markets have been chosen in order to capture different aspects of the 
FX swap bid-ask spread determination process: US dollars against Japanese yen 
(USD/JPY) and US dollars against Norwegian krone (USD/NOK). Given their status 
as G10 currencies, they share important features in terms of the broader market 
microstructure (such as standard market conventions and the physical location of the 
trading desks within the dealing rooms of the banks and interdealer brokers). In terms 
of market size and turnover, however, there are notable differences. USD/JPY is the 
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second most traded currency pair globally (with a share of 17.8%), and the daily 
turnover in the USD/JPY FX swap market was $396 billion in April 2016. 
USD/NOK, on the other hand, is ranked 19th (0.9%) with a daily turnover of $32 
billion in the USD/NOK FX swap market (BIS, 2016). Thus, as FX swaps 
conventionally are quoted against US dollars in the interbank market, the Japanese 
yen represents the largest currency after the euro, whereas the Norwegian krone is the 
smallest G10 currency subject to a floating exchange rate regime. Moreover, the vast 
majority of the trading in USD/NOK takes place in the European time zone, whereas 
the activity in USD/JPY is larger when the Asian markets are open. With regard to 
recent regulatory sanctions and scrutiny in similar financial markets and/or 
benchmarks, there are also notable differences. Several market-making banks have 
been found to have been involved in manipulative and/or collusive practises in 
relation to the Japanese yen LIBOR and TIBOR (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate), as 
well as the USD/JPY FX spot market (see, for instance, CFTC, 2014; Financial 
Services Agency, 2011; Financial Services Authority, 2012). This, however, has not 
been the case in the Norwegian krone market.  
 
Indicative price quotes by three interdealer broker and banks respectively are studied 
in order to capture the behaviour of brokers towards each other and their customers 
(banks), as well as the behaviour of banks towards each other and their customers 
(end-users). Two data sets are used for this purpose.  
 
The USD/JPY data set from 28 May 2009 to 9 June 2016 is from Bloomberg and 
consists of 1-month, 3-month and 6-month USD/JPY FX swap bid and ask quotes 
(end-of-day) from the three leading interdealer brokers in the USD/JPY FX swap 
market: Tullett [Prebon], ICAP and Meitan [Tradition] (Risk, 2015). Given that the 
FX interdealer broker market is highly concentrated, the selection ought to be 
representative. A larger data set has been obtained for USD/NOK and runs from 20 
January 2005 to 9 June 2016. It consists of 1-month, 3-month and 6-month 
USD/NOK FX swap bid and ask quotes (end-of-day) from three Nordic banks: Den 
Norske Bank (DNB), Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) and Danske Bank 
(DDB). A number of banks could, of course, claim to be prepared to quote two-way 
prices to end-users in a range of currency pairs, including the smaller ones. Interbank 
trading, however, tends to be concentrated among relatively few banks and the 
 11 
Norwegian market is no exception - having between six and ten active market makers 
at any point in time. Unfortunately, extensive historical data is difficult to obtain. 
However, three major market-making banks have posted indicative prices at least 
since 2005: DNB, DDB and SEB. Conveniently in terms of representativeness, these 
not only happen to be dominant players in the USD/NOK FX swap market but are 
also considered the largest FX dealers in Norway, Denmark and Sweden respectively 
(Euromoney, 2015). As data is scarce, the longest possible samples are used for the 
study of the bid-ask spread determination process. Naturally, it could be argued that 
more banks and brokers ought to be included. However, simply adding one institution 
would shorten the time series considerably. Moreover, given that it is not a cross-
country study per se, allowing the USD/JPY data to predate the revelations of 
manipulative and collusive practices in the FX market, and the USD/NOK data to 
predate the financial crisis of 2007-08 enables a more detailed analysis of specific 
subsample periods in Section 4.2. 
 
For the discussion in Section 5.1, a long-term data set is also used. It is from 
Bloomberg and consists of USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX spot (composite), 3-month 
USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap (Tullett and DNB respectively) bid and ask quotes 
(end-of-day), as well as daily 3-month USD LIBOR from 12 August 1997 to 9 June 
2016. The long-term dataset (which only includes one broker and one bank 
respectively) is useful in order to reflect upon the conceptualisation of the bid-ask 
spread in the academic literature. FX turnover data is collected from the BIS triennial 
central bank surveys. Indications of market shares for banks and interdealer brokers 
are from Euromoney and Risk respectively.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
It is impossible to obtain precise information on which methodology each bank or 
interdealer broker adopts to determine a price or a bid-ask spread at each moment in 
time. Therefore, competition authorities often apply different kinds of screening 
methodologies in order to detect suspicious patterns in data that might suggest the 
existence of manipulation or price-fixing conspiracies. One such mathematical screen 
is drawn from Benford (1938). According to Benford’s First Significant Digit Law, 
first digits (d=1,2,…9) are not randomly distributed, and therefore occurring 11.11% 
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of the time. Instead, the digit 1 occurs most frequently, followed by 2, 3, 4 and so on. 
Consider, for instance, the shirt numbers of soccer players. Teams have at least 11 
players, but often around double that to account for rest, tactics, injuries etc. If the 
shirts are numbered from 1 to 11, the first digit 1 occurs 27.27% of the time (1, 10 and 
11). If the shirts are numbered from 1 to 23, the lower first digits 1 and 2 are again 
overrepresented. Benford’s Law has been applied to detect that for large data sets, the 
probability that a number starts with a specific digit tends to be same (e.g. population 
of cities, electricity usage, stock prices, eBay auction prices) (see, for instance, 
Brähler et al., 2011; Varian, 1972; Giles, 2007).  
 
Importantly, a seminal paper by Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas (2011) 
showed that Benford’s Law also could be applied individual LIBOR submissions by 
banks. A violation of the law suggested that rates were generated artificially, which, if 
having been detected earlier, could have alerted antitrust authorities years before the 
LIBOR scandal broke. 
 
Formally, the distribution of the 1st digit can be written as: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 1!" = 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔!" 1+ 𝑑!! ,     (1) 
 
where 𝑑 = 1,2,… ,9. 
 
However, given that the 1st (and sometimes even the 2nd or 3rd) digit often tends to be 
‘sticky’ in financial markets, it might be more useful to look for patterns of the 2nd  
digit (or 3rd or 4th…), which includes the digit 0: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 2!" = 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔!" 1+ 10𝑘 + 𝑑!! ,!!!!    (2) 
 
where 𝑑 = 0,1,… ,9. 
 
Methodologically, the analysis in this paper is conducted in five steps. First, 
Benford’s Law is applied as a screening methodology on the 3-month FX forwards 
market. As in the study by Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas (2011), the aim is 
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to detect artificial patterns. In the FX markets, non-bank participants often hedge risk 
via FX forwards. By adding the two components (end-of-day FX spot prices and FX 
swap prices from the three interdealer brokers and banks respectively), we can run 
2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digit tests on the 3-month USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX forward 
market to investigate potentially suspicious patterns. Second, since banks 
conventionally quote FX spot and FX swaps as separate components to each other, 
the same methodology is then applied to the FX swap bid-ask spreads. Third, to detect 
whether any form of communication (or even collusion) between the interdealer 
brokers (for USD/JPY) or the banks (for USD/NOK) could have taken place ahead of 
determining the bid-ask spreads, a comparative analysis of the daily changes of each 
individually submitted 1-month, 3-month and 6-month bid-ask spread is then 
conducted. The aim of this analysis is to provide a basis for if and how competitors 
harmonise their behavioural patterns. Fourth, subsamples are then used as robustness 
checks as the bid-ask spread determination process could have been influenced by the 
revelations of the manipulative and collusive practices in the FX spot market or the 
financial crisis. A test for autocorrelation is also conducted. Finally, the empirical 
results are interpreted and discussed in relation to the literature to shed light on 
whether the bid-ask spreads are determined competitively, anti-competitively or 
following some kind of convention. 
 
 
4 Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Benford’s Law and Harmonisation Behaviour 
 
Table 1 shows the results from having run 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digit tests on the 3-
month USD/JPY FX forward market from 28 May 2009 to 9 June 2016. 
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Table 1: Benford’s Law 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digit tests 28.05.2009 – 09.06.2016 on 3-month USD/JPY 
FX forward bid prices 
Digit Benford's Law Broker (2nd) Broker (3rd) Broker (4th) Broker (5th) 
0 11.97% 24.62% 9.29% 11.59% 10.42% 
1 11.39% 17.97% 12.91% 10.73% 11.21% 
2 10.88% 15.11% 13.61% 9.85% 9.19% 
3 10.43% 5.82% 11.04% 10.16% 9.58% 
4 10.03% 3.63% 9.29% 10.15% 9.30% 
5 9.67% 2.91% 6.48% 8.81% 10.48% 
6 9.34% 6.48% 7.89% 8.17% 11.14% 
7 9.04% 6.32% 8.94% 9.98% 10.49% 
8 8.76% 8.42% 10.09% 11.61% 8.83% 
9 8.50% 8.72% 10.46% 8.94% 9.36% 𝜒!  1,712.12 191.61 77.93 72.09 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table shows the expected observed 
frequency following Benford’s Second Significant Digit Law (see Equation 2) and the actual observed 
frequency of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digits as percentages. The 3-month USD/JPY FX forward bid prices 
are calculated using end-of-day USD/JPY FX spot (composite) bid prices and 3-month USD/JPY FX 
swap bid quotes from Tullett, ICAP and Meitan. The number of observations is 5,460. 
 
Given the large sample size  (5,460 observations), it is not surprising that we get 
inflated 𝜒! test values. However, from Table 1 we can see how the ‘big figure’ 
matters. Even by removing the 1st digit, the Benford’s Law test indicates some degree 
of price clustering around the numbers 0,1 and 2. When applying the methodology to 
the 3rd, 4th and 5th digits, however, the pattern appears to be receding – suggesting that 
the data set is of little interest for competition authorities at least.  
 
Table 2 shows the results for the 3-month USD/NOK FX forward market using bank 
rather than interdealer broker data and a larger data set (8,823 observations from 20 
January 2005 to 9 June 2016).  
 
Table 2: Benford’s Law 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digit tests 20.01.2005 – 09.06.2016 on 3-month USD/NOK 
FX forward bid prices 
Digit Benford's Law Bank (2nd) Bank (3rd) Bank (4th) Bank (5th) 
0 11.97% 10.31% 9.00% 10.10% 10.25% 
1 11.39% 10.78% 9.74% 11.74% 9.00% 
2 10.88% 7.46% 9.93% 10.27% 10.22% 
3 10.43% 6.06% 9.27% 9.66% 9.76% 
4 10.03% 10.16% 8.51% 10.67% 10.04% 
5 9.67% 9.29% 9.54% 9.60% 10.28% 
6 9.34% 8.09% 8.12% 10.27% 10.47% 
7 9.04% 18.30% 9.54% 8.94% 10.50% 
8 8.76% 9.12% 14.54% 8.87% 9.75% 
9 8.50% 10.42% 11.81% 9.88% 9.74% 𝜒!  1,172.62 592.40 66.69 135.35 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table shows the expected observed 
frequency following Benford’s Second Significant Digit Law (see Equation 2) and the actual observed 
frequency of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th digits as percentages. The 3-month USD/NOK FX forward bid 
prices are calculated using end-of-day USD/NOK FX spot (composite) bid prices and 3-month 
USD/NOK FX swap bid quotes from DNB, SEB and DDB. The number of observations is 8,823. 
 
 15 
Again, some price clustering is prevalent when running the 2nd and 3rd digit tests 
(numbers 7 and 8 respectively). However, anything that potentially could be regarded 
as a suspicious pattern disappears when the test is applied to the 4th and 5th digits.  
 
When running a test on the 3-month USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spread for the same 
period, however, we get remarkably different results. From Table 3 we can 
immediately see that Benford’s Law is violated when disregarding the FX spot rates 
and applying it directly to the swap spreads submitted by the three interdealer brokers. 
Having removed the 1st digit from the dataset, we get an extremely high 𝜒! test values 
when comparing the frequency of each 2nd digit with the expected frequency expected 
according to Benford’s Law. The digit 1 appears more than 37% of the time, whereas 
digits 7, 8 and 9 hardly appear at all. We can also conduct a similar test on the 3rd 
digit of the bid-ask spread.3 As the Table 3 shows, three digits are prevalent: 0, 1 and 
5. The corresponding results for the USD/NOK dataset demonstrate that digits 0 and 5 
are totally dominant when running the 2nd digit test and 0 the only one appearing in 
the 3rd digit test. Thus, whereas FX forward prices do not seem to display indications 
of artificiality, the FX swap bid-ask spreads do.  
 
Table 3: Benford’s Law 2nd and 3rd digit tests 28.05.2009 – 09.06.2016 on 3-month USD/JPY FX swap 
broker and 3-month USD/NOK FX swap bank bid-ask spreads 
Digit Benford's Law Broker (2nd) Broker (3rd) Bank (2nd) Bank (3rd) 
0 11.97% 10.97% 64.65% 42.28% 100.00% 
1 11.39% 37.73% 7.69% 0.05% 0.00% 
2 10.88% 15.40% 1.28% 0.14% 0.00% 
3 10.43% 17.71% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00% 
4 10.03% 4.67% 0.71% 0.06% 0.00% 
5 9.67% 9.05% 15.15% 57.16% 0.00% 
6 9.34% 3.39% 1.87% 0.00% 0.00% 
7 9.04% 0.24% 0.92% 0.28% 0.00% 
8 8.76% 0.73% 2.69% 0.02% 0.00% 
9 8.50% 0.11% 4.98% 0.00% 0.00% 𝜒!  5,397.65 15,426.79 34,160.71 64,887.16 
Observations 5,460 8,823 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table shows the expected observed 
frequency following Benford’s Second Significant Digit Law (see Equation 2) and the actual observed 
frequency of the 2nd and 3rd digits as percentages. The 3-month USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads are 
calculated using end-of-day bid and ask quotes from Tullett, ICAP and Meitan. The 3-month 
USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads are calculated using end-of-day bid and ask quotes from DNB, 
SEB and DDB.  
 
In order to examine the bid-ask spread determination process in more detail, we can 
conduct a comparative analysis of the daily changes of each individually submitted 
bid-ask spreads. After all, Benford’s Law is concerned only about single digits, not 
                                                
3 A fourth digit does not exist for the 3-month USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads. 
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spreads which may consist of a string of digits. Table 4 shows the frequency of 
occasions when the three competing interdealer brokers have posted precisely the 
same bid-ask spreads for 1-month, 3-month and 6-month USD/JPY FX swaps on their 
respective screens.  
 
Table 4: Harmonised USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads 28.05.2009 – 09.06.2016 
Interdealer broker combination Tullett / Meitan Tullett / ICAP Meitan / ICAP Tullett / Meitan / 
ICAP 
Total days 1820 1820 1820 1820 
Same 1M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
15 
(0.8%) 
887 
(48.7%) 
22 
(1.2%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1 
(6.7%) 
634 
(71.5%) 
5 
(22.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 3M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
28 
(1.5%) 
803 
(44.1%) 
5 
(0.3%) 
3 
(0.2%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
11 
(39.3%) 
577 
(71.9%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 6M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
28 
(1.5%) 
597 
(32.8%) 
4 
(0.2%) 
2 
(0.1%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
14 
(50.0%) 
516 
(86.4%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three interdealer brokers have submitted exactly the same 
bid-ask spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated 
the following day. 
 
As can be seen, during the period from 28 May 2009 to 9 June 2016, Tullett and 
ICAP posted exactly the same bid-ask spreads on 803 occasions out of 1,820 (44.1% 
of the time). Moreover, the period consisted of 577 trading days when the two 
competitors replicated their harmonised behaviour from the previous day. Seen from 
this perspective, the quotes by Meitan have clearly been outliers. The pattern is 
similar when applying it to other maturities. As Table 4 demonstrates, Tullett and 
ICAP not only seem to have coordinated their bid-ask spread behaviour in the 3-
month USD/JPY FX swap market. The results indicate that an identical bid-ask 
spread matrix (akin to a ‘price list’) often has been applied to 1-month and 6-month 
maturities as well. This matrix has then, despite movements in the prices themselves, 
remained ‘sticky’ until a recalibration has taken place. 
 
The corresponding results for the 1-month, 3-month and 6-month USD/NOK FX 
swaps are even more remarkable (Table 5). Despite covering a period of more than a 
decade, the three competing banks posted exactly the same bid-ask spreads on their 
respective screens on around nine days out of ten. 
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Table 5: Harmonised USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 20.01.2005 – 09.06.2016 
Bank combination SEB+DNB SEB+DDB DNB+DDB SEB+DNB+DDB 
Total days 2941 2941 2941 2941 
Same 1M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
2874 
(97.7%) 
2655 
(90.3%) 
2690 
(91.5%) 
2650 
(90.1%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
2859 
(97.2%) 
2625 
(89.3%) 
2660 
(90.4%) 
2617 
(89.0%) 
Same 3M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
2880 
(97.9%) 
2643 
(89.9%) 
2666 
(90.6%) 
2639 
(89.7%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
2868 
(97.5%) 
2617 
(89.0%) 
2636 
(89.6%) 
2609 
(88.7%) 
Same 6M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
2867 
(97.5%) 
2733 
(92.9%) 
2764 
(94.0%) 
2724 
(92.6%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
2848 
(96.8%) 
2716 
(92.3%) 
2747 
(93.4%) 
2701 
(91.8%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three banks have submitted exactly the same bid-ask 
spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated the 
following day. 
 
4.2 Further Tests and Robustness Checks  
 
Given the very long time series used in the tests above, some further checks might be 
needed to assess the validity of the results. In particular, the bid-ask spread 
determination process could have been influenced by the revelations of the 
manipulative and collusive practices in the FX spot market – as well as by the 
financial crisis, which is widely known to have impacted the liquidity provision by 
banks in a range of financial instruments.  
 
The Bloomberg article ‘Traders Said to Rig Currency Rates to Profit Off Clients’ 
(Vaughan, Finch and Choudhury, 2013) was published on 12 June 2013. As it, 
together with a string of other news reports that followed, pointed towards misconduct 
predominantly in the major currency pairs (in line with the LIBOR and TIBOR 
investigations which were on-going at the time), it might have had an impact on the 
bid-ask spread determination among the brokers in the USD/JPY FX swap market as 
well. If so, less clustering ought to be observed after the publication of the article. 
 
As Table 6 shows that, despite using two 2-year subsamples immediately before and 
after the widely read and cited Bloomberg article, the Benford’s Law test still 
indicates a high degree of price clustering. 
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Table 6: Benford’s Law 2nd and 3rd digit tests on 3-month USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads 
Digit Benford's Law 13.06.2011 – 12.06.2013 13.06.2013 – 12.06.2015 
Broker (2nd) Broker (3rd) Broker (2nd) Broker (3rd) 
0 11.97% 4.59% 62.84% 15.62% 64.50% 
1 11.39% 48.06% 4.91% 39.52% 14.09% 
2 10.88% 10.01% 0.96% 6.82% 1.53% 
3 10.43% 21.54% 0.00% 23.39% 0.00% 
4 10.03% 5.86% 0.96% 4.65% 0.00% 
5 9.67% 3.51% 16.32% 3.25% 14.28% 
6 9.34% 3.82% 1.34% 6.76% 0.00% 
7 9.04% 0.32% 0.06% 0.00% 2.55% 
8 8.76% 2.29% 2.55% 0.00% 2.17% 
9 8.50% 0.00% 10.07% 0.00% 0.89% 𝜒!  2,590.40 4,277.38 1,919.54 4,512.81 
Observations 1,569 1,569 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table shows the expected observed 
frequency following Benford’s Second Significant Digit Law (see Equation 2) and the actual observed 
frequency of the 2nd and 3rd digits as percentages. The 3-month USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads are 
calculated using end-of-day bid and ask quotes from Tullett, ICAP and Meitan.  
 
Neither did it serve to eliminate the bid-ask spread submission behaviour of Tullett 
and ICAP (see Table 7 and Table 8).  
 
Table 7: Harmonised USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads 13.06.2011 – 12.06.2013 
Interdealer broker combination Tullett / Meitan Tullett / ICAP Meitan / ICAP Tullett / Meitan / 
ICAP 
Total days 523 523 523 523 
Same 1M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
5 
(1.0%) 
345 
(66.0%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1 
(20.0%) 
282 
(81.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 3M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
311 
(59.5%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
259 
(83.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 6M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
308 
(58.9%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
268 
(87.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three interdealer brokers have submitted exactly the same 
bid-ask spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated 
the following day. 
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Table 8: Harmonised USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads 13.06.2013 – 12.06.2015 
Interdealer broker combination Tullett / Meitan Tullett / ICAP Meitan / ICAP Tullett / Meitan / 
ICAP 
Total days 523 523 523 523 
Same 1M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
2 
(0.4%) 
194 
(37.1%) 
11 
(2.1%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
0 
(20.0%) 
111 
(81.7%) 
5 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 3M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
3 
(0.6%) 
188 
(35.9%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1 
(0.0%) 
101 
(83.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Same 6M USD/JPY FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
7 
(1.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(87.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three interdealer brokers have submitted exactly the same 
bid-ask spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated 
the following day. 
 
However, the coordination was considerably less prominent during the period after 
the publication of the Bloomberg article. Whereas the two competing firms continued 
to submit identical 1-month and 3-month bid-ask spreads one more than a third of all 
trading days, the spread submission behaviour in the 6-month USD/JPY FX swap was 
no longer harmonised. 
 
Given not only the larger dataset obtained for USD/NOK but also the fact that smaller 
currency pairs were under relatively less scrutiny as a result of the Bloomberg article 
above, the observations have been split into three periods: before, during and after the 
financial crisis. 
 
Table 9: Benford’s Law 2nd and 3rd digit tests on 3-month USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 
Digit Benford's 
Law 
20.01.2005 – 08.08.2007 09.08.2007 – 07.08.2009 10.08.2007 – 09.06.2016 
Bank (2nd) Bank (3rd) Bank (2nd) Bank (3rd) Bank (2nd) Bank (3rd) 
0 11.97% 99.80% 100.00% 97.00% 100.00% 4.40% 100.00% 
1 11.39% 0.05% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 10.88% 0.05% 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
3 10.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 10.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 9.67% 0.05% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 95.56% 0.00% 
6 9.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
7 9.04% 0.05% 0.00% 1.47% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
8 8.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
9 8.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 𝜒!  14,516.87 14,583.61 10,748.07 11,516.86 44,619.26 38,786.68 
Observations 1,566 1,983 5,274 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table shows the expected observed 
frequency following Benford’s Second Significant Digit Law (see Equation 2) and the actual observed 
frequency of the 2nd and 3rd digits as percentages. The 3-month USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 
are calculated using end-of-day bid and ask quotes from DNB, SEB and DDB. 
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Again, as Table 9 shows, using subsamples do not alter the overall picture that 
extreme price clustering is prominent in the USD/NOK FX swap market. Indeed, 
Table 10 (the period before the financial crisis of 2007-8) depicts a consistent pattern. 
Between 20 January 2005 and 8 August 2007 (the day before the outbreak of the 
crisis), the three competing banks submitted identical bid-ask spreads for 1-month, 
3month and 6-month USD/NOK FX swaps on more than 99% of the occasions.  
 
Table 10: Harmonised USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 20.01.2005 – 08.08.2007 
Bank combination SEB+DNB SEB+DDB DNB+DDB SEB+DNB+DDB 
Total days 661 661 661 661 
Same 1M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
656 
(99.2%) 
657 
(99.4%) 
654 
(98.9%) 
653 
(98.8%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
653 
(98.8%) 
653 
(98.8%) 
649 
(98.2%) 
647 
(97.9%) 
Same 3M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
657 
(99.4%) 
660 
(99.8%) 
658 
(99.5%) 
657 
(99.4%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
653 
(98.8%) 
659 
(99.7%) 
655 
(99.1%) 
653 
(98.8%) 
Same 6M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
655 
(99.1%) 
660 
(99.8%) 
656 
(99.2%) 
655 
(99.1%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
649 
(98.2%) 
659 
(99.7%) 
651 
(98.5%) 
649 
(98.2%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three banks have submitted exactly the same bid-ask 
spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated the 
following day. 
 
As is well documented, the financial crisis caused substantial volatility, uncertainty 
and illiquidity in the FX swap markets. It would, therefore, be plausible to assume 
that pre-agreed spread matrices might become increasingly difficult to adhere to by 
market makers. However, as Table 11 demonstrates, SEB, DNB and DDB still 
managed to ‘successfully’ harmonise their bid-ask spread quotations in on 388, 389 
and 465 out of 522 trading days in the 1-month, 3-month and 6-month markets 
respectively during the 2-year period starting 9 August 2007. 
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Table 11: Harmonised USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 09.08.2007 – 07.08.2009 
Bank combination SEB+DNB SEB+DDB DNB+DDB SEB+DNB+DDB 
Total days 522 522 522 522 
Same 1M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
465 
(89.1%) 
389 
(74.5%) 
422 
(80.8%) 
388 
(74.3%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
457 
(85.7%) 
372 
(71.3%) 
402 
(77.0%) 
370 
(70.9%) 
Same 3M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
469 
(89.8%) 
390 
(74.7%) 
412 
(78.9%) 
389 
(74.5%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
465 
(89.1%) 
373 
(71.5%) 
390 
(74.7%) 
371 
(71.1%) 
Same 6M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
467 
(89.5%) 
469 
(89.8%) 
492 
(94.3%) 
465 
(89.1%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
461 
(88.3%) 
462 
(88.5%) 
483 
(92.5%) 
457 
(87.5%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three banks have submitted exactly the same bid-ask 
spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated the 
following day. 
 
Since the aftermath of the financial crisis (from 10 August 2009 to 9 June 2016), 
however, the pattern has almost returned to pre-crisis levels (see Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Harmonised USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 10.08.2009 – 09.06.2016 
Bank combination SEB+DNB SEB+DDB DNB+DDB SEB+DNB+DDB 
Total days 1,758 1,758 1,758 1,758 
Same 1M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
1,753 
(99.7%) 
1,609 
(91.5%) 
1,614 
(91.8%) 
1,609 
(91.5%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1,749 
(99.5%) 
1,600 
(91.0%) 
1,609 
(91.5%) 
1,600 
(91.0%) 
Same 3M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
1,754 
(99.8%) 
1,593 
(90.6%) 
1,596 
(90.8%) 
1,593 
(90.6%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1,750 
(99.5%) 
1,585 
(90.2%) 
1,591 
(90.5%) 
1,585 
(90.2%) 
Same 6M USD/NOK FX swap 
bid-ask spread 
1,745 
(99.3%) 
1,604 
(91.2%) 
1,616 
(91.9%) 
1,604 
(91.2%) 
Repetition of the same bid-ask 
spread 
1,738 
(98.9%) 
1,595 
(90.7%) 
1,613 
(91.8%) 
1,595 
(90.7%) 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: The table first shows the number (and 
percentage) of trading days when two or all three banks have submitted exactly the same bid-ask 
spread, and then the number (and percentage) of trading days such behaviour has been repeated the 
following day. 
 
Furthermore, as Table 13 shows, the autocorrelation for the daily change in the 3-
month FX swap bid-ask spread difference between various combinations of banks 
and/or interdealer broker is very high in comparison with the daily change of the 
actual prices themselves. Individually quoted market prices can, for various reasons, 
be sticky over time. The autocorrelation matrix confirms, however, that the bid-ask 
spreads and differences between the bid-ask spreads among the competing institutions 
(or the lack of them) are even more correlated.  
 22 
Table 13: Autocorrelation in 3-month FX swaps 
Currency pair USD/JPY USD/NOK 
Period 28.05.2009 – 09.06.2016 20.01.2005 – 09.06.2016 
 Broker AC Bank AC 
3-month FX swap (change) 
 
Tullett -0.0407 SEB -0.1208 
Meitan -0.0559 DNB 0.0228 
ICAP -0.0062 DDB -0.2582 
3-month FX swap bid-ask spread  (change) 
 
Tullett -0.4284 SEB -0.3168 
Meitan -0.0664 DNB -0.2924 
ICAP -0.1485 DDB -0.3254 
3-month FX swap bid-ask spread difference (change) Tullett - Meitan -0.3265 SEB - DNB -0.3703 
Tullett - ICAP -0.3608 SEB - DDB -0.3577 
Meitan - ICAP -0.3285 DNB - DDB -0.3691 
Lower critical value (95% confidence level)  -0.0460  -0.0361 
Upper critical value (95% confidence level)  0.0460  0.0361 
Lower critical value (99% confidence level)  -0.0605  -0.0476 
Upper critical value (99% confidence level)  0.0605  0.0476 
Observations 1819 2940 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: the table shows the autocorrelation (AC) with a 
1-day lag for the change in the 3M FX swap points and the change in the 3M FX swap bid-ask spread 
for the different broker and banks, as well as the change in the difference between the 3M FX swap 
bid-ask spreads posted by the different broker and bank combinations.  
 
In sum, the results suggest not only an extreme level of price clustering with regards 
to the bid-ask spreads in the USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap markets but also an 
artificial price pattern that is consistent with some form of coordination between 
competing banks and/or interdealer brokers.  
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
I light of the empirical results, let us now turn to a discussion on the competitive 
aspects with regards to the bid-ask spread determination process.  
 
5.1 A Competitive Market? 
 
Before the manipulative and collusive practices in relation to LIBOR and FX were 
revealed, the FX spot market was widely perceived to be too competitive to be subject 
to market abusive behaviour. In fact, few markets (if any) were perceived as more 
competitive than the global FX markets  – lending support to the logic that the bid-ask 
spread determination is a function of three types of costs (Bessembinder, 1994; Stoll, 
1989). Following traditional market microstructure theory, large and competitive 
markets ought to drive bid-ask spreads towards zero when market liquidity is good 
and volatility low. The logic also works the other way round. Large, liquid and fairly 
stable markets could give indications of a competitive price determination process. 
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Although it is beyond the scope (and purpose) of this paper to deconstruct the FX 
swap bid-ask spread in a similar fashion as has been conducted in the FX spot market, 
it is useful to highlight some long-term differences and similarities between the 
markets before analysing the empirical results presented in Section 4. 
 
At the outset, the USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap markets present themselves as 
highly liquid markets. Figure 1, depicting the daily bid-ask spreads in the 3-month 
USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap markets, illustrates this.  
 
Figure 1: 3-month USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads, annualised in terms of yield (%) 
(LHS) and relative to the respective FX spot prices (%) (RHS) 12.08.1997-09.06.2016 
Sources: Bloomberg and author's calculations. Notes: The bid-ask spreads are calculated using end-of-
day bid and ask quotes for USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX spot (composite) as well as 3-month 
USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap quotes (Tullett and DNB respectively). The FX swap bid-ask 
spreads are annualised in terms of yield following the covered interest rate parity (see Footnote 1). 
 
Historically, the bid-ask spread in the 3-month USD/JPY FX swap market has been 
remarkably tight. Prior to August 2007, only extreme events such as the Japanese 
banking crisis, Y2K and 9/11 caused the spread to widen significantly. The impact of 
the financial crisis of 2007-08 was strong, though. As a percentage of the FX spot 
price, the spread quadrupled from 0.01% to around 0.04%, and the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers resulted in a temporary bid-ask spread of over 0.55%. Although the 
market quickly recovered in 2009, following extraordinary monetary policy measures 
by a range of central banks, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and policy measures 
linked to ‘Abenomics’ (leading to concern about the ability of banks to raise USD 
funding in the FX swap market) led to renewed uncertainty in 2011 and 2015 
respectively. The development of the bid-ask spread in the smaller 3-month 
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USD/NOK FX swap market has been rather different. Having previously been very 
tight, the currency turbulence in 1998 and the subsequent adoption of a floating 
exchange rate regime caused the spread to widen to around 0.10% of the spot price. 
The impact of the financial crisis of 2007-08 was substantial, yet the recovery process 
slower.  
 
For the FX market, the bid-ask spread tends to be a good proxy for liquidity (King, 
Osler and Rime, 2013). Naturally, there are several other measures, and the bid-ask 
spread is only one of them (although by far the most easily observable). According to 
Kyle (1985), market liquidity risk also includes market depth (showing how many 
units traders can sell or buy at the current bid or ask spread without moving the price) 
and market resiliency (how long it will take for prices that have temporarily fallen to 
bounce back).  
 
Seen from the perspective of the bid-ask spread, in the long run, both FX swap 
markets present themselves as very liquid. Despite the differences, however, both FX 
swap markets seem to be similarly affected by stress, or perceived stress, in the 
financial system. To some degree, parallels can be drawn to the FX spot market, 
where bid-ask spreads have been found to widen because of higher inventory risk 
(Bassembinder 1994; Glassman 1987). However, as an FX swap involves an FX spot 
transaction with a simultaneous FX forward transaction in the opposite direction, 
contracts also contain elements of credit risk and funding liquidity risk (see, for 
instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Baba and Packer, 2009). It could, 
therefore, be argued that the FX swap market, being more closely connected than the 
FX spot market to the unsecured money market, could be more affected by funding 
liquidity than market liquidity. As these not only tend to be time-varying but also 
closely connected, it might be difficult to draw conclusions from episodes of financial 
crises. For instance, surveys conducted among banks in the Eurozone during 2003-
2015 suggest that the FX swap market has been perceived to be less efficient and 
liquid than the interest rate derivative market which is subject to minimal credit and 
funding liquidity risk (e.g. for overnight index swaps and forward rate agreements), 
but considerably more efficient and liquid the unsecured money market (ECB, 2016). 
In other words, although such risk is smaller than in the uncollateralised money 
market, a severe credit and/or liquidity crunch ought to widen the FX swap bid-ask 
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spread for longer maturities, such as 3 months. The occasionally wide (crisis-related) 
spreads depicted in Figure 1 confirm this logic. Moreover, although Table 11 does not 
suggest a ‘breakdown’ in the bid-ask spread harmonisation among the three 
Norwegian banks during the financial crisis, the relative illiquidity undoubtedly 
played a role in causing uncertainty with regards to the reciprocal quoting behaviour. 
In particular, during the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
SEB, DNB and DDB submitted highly diverse bid-ask spreads for all maturities 
studied.  
 
Both FX swap markets are comparable to their relative FX spot markets in terms of 
size. The wider spreads in the 3-month USD/NOK FX swap market seem consistent 
with the fact that despite being large, the market is substantially smaller than the 
world’s second most traded currency pair. As can be seen from Table 9, BIS estimates 
that the daily turnover involving the Japanese yen swaps and forwards surpassed $600 
billion in 2016, a four-fold increase in two decades. This helps to explain the 
immensely tight, and seemingly competitive, bid-ask spread. With a daily turnover of 
around $50 billion, the USD/NOK FX swap and forward markets are far behind, 
consistent with the notion that trading volume has a negative effect on the bid-ask 
spread in the long run (Hartmann, 1988).  
 
Table 14: Daily average turnover in the JPY and NOK FX markets (USD mio, April) 
 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 
JPY FX Spot 109,039 142,863 100,624 130,381 205,958 300,214 612,341 394,931 
JPY FX Forwards 28,353 34,586 33,257 47,135 61,453 115,111 122,686 151,068 
JPY FX Swaps 136,696 122,614 132,169 181,715 242,319 278,897 331,876 457,929 
NOK FX Spot N/A N/A 2,605 4,741 12,326 12,335 21,395 29,022 
NOK FX Forwards N/A N/A 1,187 2,543 6,498 6,153 10,096 8,320 
NOK FX Swaps N/A N/A 13,909 18,430 48,140 31,602 42,913 43,849 
Sources: BIS (1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016). 
 
FX price volatility has also been found to have a direct impact on the bid-ask spread. 
However, as FX swaps are premia or discounts quoted in pips, it is useful to compare 
the volatility of the FX spot price with the components that drive the premium or 
discount, following the covered interest rate parity. As an FX swap can be seen as the 
interest rate differential between two currencies expressed in FX pips, the 60-day 
historical volatility for the difference between the 3-month USD LIBOR and implied 
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3-month JPY and NOK interest rates from the FX market should serve as very close 
approximations.  
 
Figure 2: Volatility of USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX Spot (LHS); 3-month USD LIBOR, USD/JPY and 
USD/NOK FX swap (RHS) 04.11.1997-09.06.2016 
Sources: Bloomberg and author's calculations. Notes: the 60-day volatility is calculated using the 3-
month USD LIBOR and end-of-day mid quotes for USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX spot (composite) as 
well as 3-month USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap quotes (Tullett and DNB respectively). The 
implied interest rate differential follows the covered interest rate parity (see Footnote 1). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the volatility of both 3-month FX swap currency pairs 
has been low, or even extremely low, since 1998: ranging between 0.5% and 3.5% 
and more comparable to that of 3-month USD LIBOR than their respective FX spot 
markets (which have ranged been 6% and 14% during the period). Again, notable 
exceptions are the Japanese banking crisis, the Norwegian currency turbulence in 
1998 and the 2007-08 financial crisis.  
 
In sum, both FX swap markets have been subject to considerably lower volatility their 
FX spot markets. Both markets are also as large, or larger than the respective FX spot 
markets. Finally, although the bid-ask spread in the USD/NOK FX swap market has 
been wider than in the USD/JPY FX swap market, Figure 1 suggests that both 
markets could be considered as very liquid (with tight bid-ask spreads even during 
times of volatility and crisis). Over the long-run, both markets appear competitive and 
it would seem as if any attempts to engage in manipulative or collusive practices 
ought to, in theory, be unsuccessful. 
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5.2 An Anti-Competitive Market? 
 
Despite being astonishingly large and liquid, however, the global FX market is 
remarkably concentrated within a relatively small group of very large banks. 
According to a survey conducted by Euromoney (2012), which captures client price 
taking activity only and not any interbank or interdealer broking volumes, the top 15 
banks had a total market share of 87% in 2012. In the FX swap market, the top 10 
banks had a total market share of 78%. Most currency pairs have experienced an 
increase in concentration during the last two decades. For instance, with regards to the 
FX turnover in Japan, the number of banks accounting for 75% of decreased from 19 
in 1998 to just 8 in 2010 (BIS, 2010).  
 
A considerable proportion of trading between banks takes place via interdealer 
brokers. The FX interdealer broker market is even more concentrated than the overall 
market, with a handful of dominant firms. Tullett Prebon, BGC, ICAP, GFI and 
Tradition collectively obtained 88.5% of the votes in the latest Risk Interdealer 
Ranking (Risk, 2015), which serves as a reflection of how banks view brokers in 
terms of overall quality of service. Although their individual volumes are not 
reported, the figure confirms anecdotal evidence that FX traders at banks typically 
speak to 3-5 of the major competing interdealer broker firms.4 
 
The empirical results in Section 4 can be summarised as follows. A screening test for 
collusion in the 3-month USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX forward market (Table 1 and 
Table 2) do not suggest any suspicious activity. However, when looking at an 
individual price component, the FX swap bid-ask spread, the pattern is strikingly 
different. Table 3 shows extreme clustering around the numbers 0 and 5 for the 
USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads. Thus, the round number effect, 
which has been shown to exist in the FX spot market and other OTC markets, is also 
prevalent in the FX swap market. 
 
                                                
4 The survey is not designed to capture market share. Rather, the banks are supposed to ‘base their 
decisions on a variety of criteria, including cost, liquidity provision, technology support and reliability’ 
(Risk, 2015). 
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Interestingly, however, for all three interdealer brokers studied, the change in the 
USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spread tends to be zero, regardless of the change in the 
actual FX spot or FX swap price. In other words, the spread tends to be characterised 
by an extremely high degree of price clustering around a few numbers through a 
behavioural pattern that, between the two dominant interdealer brokers (ICAP and 
Tullett), is based on coordination and repetition of such coordination (see Table 4). 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of the individual USD/JPY 3-month FX swap bid-ask 
spreads during the same period. We can see that the two dominant interdealer brokers, 
Tullett and ICAP, consistently quoted more competitive bid-ask spreads than third-
ranked Meitan. It also appears as if the individual broker quotes have clustered around 
spreads of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5, rather than, say, 0.08, 0.13 or 0.7. Theoretically, 
such behavioural pattern is consistent with Ball et al. (1985) and could suggest that a 
form of bid-ask spread matrix has been used - which then has been ‘recalibrated’ over 
time.  
 
Figure 3: Frequency of 3-month USD/JPY FX Swap spreads 28.05.2009–09.06.2016
Sources: Bloomberg and author's calculations. Notes: The 3-month USD/JPY FX swap bid-ask spreads are 
calculated using end-of-day bid and ask quotes from Tullett, ICAP and Meitan. The number of observations is 
5,441 (for the sake of clarity, 19 observations where the bid-ask spread is higher than 1.52 have been excluded). 
 
This pattern is even more pronounced among the three banks in the USD/NOK FX 
swap market. As Table 9 demonstrates: DNB, SEB and DDB have clearly harmonised 
their indicative 1-month, 3-month and 6-month USD/NOK FX swap bid-ask spreads 
throughout the period studied. Whereas the financial crisis of 2007-08 acted to break 
down the pattern to some degree, the coordination behaviour has since returned 
almost to pre-crisis levels.  
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Thus, even though the empirical results do not provide any evidence as to whether 
interdealer brokers and banks in the USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap markets have 
colluded with each other, the patterns are nonetheless striking enough to suggest that 
some form of coordination has taken place. In fact, results are even more extreme than 
those detected by Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas (2011) using a similar 
methodology on the US dollar LIBOR, as well as the findings by Christie and Schultz 
(1994ab) on actively traded NASDAQ stocks. In the latter case, the authors found that 
odd-eight quotes were more or less non-existent among 70% of the stocks. Instead, 
individual stocks were quoted in increments of $¼ and $½ rather than, say, $3/8 or 
$5/8 - prompting the question as to whether a large number of market makers on 
NASDAQ tacitly colluded to maintain wide bid-ask spreads.  
 
5.3 A Harmful Convention? 
 
Screening methodologies, such as Benford’s Law, can be useful tools in detecting 
potential price-fixing conspiracies in financial markets. No matter how suspicious the 
empirical results seem, however, further evidence (in terms of actual verbal or 
electronic communication) is always required to reach a conclusive outcome. 
Moreover, although the methodology has successfully been applied to LIBOR 
(Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas, 2011), it is questionable whether it is an 
appropriate methodology for markets involving uncollateralised borrowing and 
lending in any form. As Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, p. 26) point out, ‘interest rates 
are not like conventional prices and the capital market is not like an auction market’. 
Prices in markets involving uncollateralised borrowing and lending (such as 
Eurodollars and FX swaps) depend on judgements on creditworthiness and access to 
funding liquidity, which deviates from the anonymous nature of markets in the 
Arrow-Debreu model. Instead, prices (and consequently also bid-ask spreads) in these 
markets are highly dependent on the relationships between the counterparties 
involved. This has two important consequences.  
 
First, given the role of banks in the first stage of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, prices involving borrowing and lending have a natural ‘anchor’: the 
official central bank rate. This, rather than any form of price conspiracy, explains the 
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observation why the interest rate benchmarks tend to observe an extreme level of 
clustering and ‘stickiness’. Therefore, unless there is a change in the projected central 
bank rate, or the assessments of credit and/or liquidity risk, prices submitted by 
competitors may remain stable and identical even in the absence of improper 
communication. 
 
Second, given the requirement to continuously assess creditworthiness and funding 
liquidity, transparency in the form of tradable prices becomes difficult to obtain. This 
is particularly obvious with regards to LIBOR, where individually submitted quotes 
are not binding or tradable prices. Instead, banks are asked, without being able to see 
each other’s quotes, to submit their rates according to the following criteria: ‘At what 
rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting 
interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?’ (IBA, 2014, p. 12). 
Therefore, LIBOR (but also its equivalents elsewhere) can be seen as benchmarks for 
where the selected panel banks argue prices in the money market are.  
 
Prices in the FX swap market cannot directly be compared to LIBOR, which is an 
interest rate benchmark. However, there are important similarities. Although 
electronic trading has become standard in the FX spot market, market-making banks 
do not continuously supply the market with firm and tradable two-way prices in FX 
swaps. Consequently, banks and end-users remain overwhelmingly reliant on 
indicative quotes for price discovery and valuation. Indicative prices from Bloomberg 
or Reuters might, naturally, over- or understate the magnitude of the actual bid-ask 
spread at any moment in time. However, they should serve as a good approximation 
because of the reputational damage caused by repeatedly submitting prices deviating 
from the actual market price (Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; Cheung and Wong, 2000). 
A similar approach could be taken with regards to interdealer broker quotes. If the 
broker spread were to be too wide, banks would turn to competing brokers for price 
discovery and possibly future business. With reference to the empirical results in 
Section 4, this logic could, of course, be applied to explain to continuing dominance 
of Tullett and ICAP in the USD/JPY FX swap market. If the indicative spread were to 
be unreasonably narrow, however, banks would be disappointed when placing firm 
buy or sell orders. Therefore, an indicative interdealer broker bid-ask spread matrix 
ought to serve as a ‘best guess’ of what brokers perceive banks would expect as a 
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reasonable bid-ask spread for various maturities - in other words, which bid-ask 
spreads banks expect of other banks. It could be argued that interdealer brokers should 
have nothing to gain from colluding to set bid-ask spreads, as their business model is 
based on matching buyers and sellers in the interbank market. However, given the 
large market shares held by only a few firms, antitrust authorities could equally argue 
that competition more widely could be harmed should two or more interdealer brokers 
decide to harmonise their behaviour towards banks. This mirrors the concern raised 
by the UK Competition and Markets Authority in June 2016 with regards to oil 
products, following the announcement of a planned merger between the rivals Tullett 
Prebon and ICAP (Stafford, 2016). In sum, then, indicative (i.e. non-tradable) prices, 
benchmarks and bid-ask spreads remain, and are likely to remain, paramount in the 
price discovery process for FX and interest rate instruments for banks and end-users 
alike. At the same time, however, screening methodologies are likely to find evidence 
of a high likelihood of communication or signalling between firms that ought to 
compete with each other.  
 
The empirical results in Section 4, both with regards to USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX 
swaps, also seem to challenge traditional market microstructure theory, where market 
makers are assumed to quote two-way prices competitively following the original 
Bertrand analysis. Instead, they seem more consistent with survey-based research 
conducted by Cheung and Wong (2000) and Cheung and Chinn (2001). Having found 
that a majority of FX dealers rely on ‘market conventions’ rather than ‘costs’ when 
determining bid-ask spreads, the overriding reason for following the prevailing 
convention appears to have been to maintain an ‘equitable and reciprocal trading 
relationship’ (60.2% among Tokyo-based banks), ‘firm policy’ (12.5%) and ‘market 
image’ (14.8%). Interestingly, only 5.7% of the FX dealers in Tokyo cited ‘trading 
profits’ as being the main reason for following the market convention. The responses 
in the other financial centres were fairly similar. Thus, it appears as if market makers 
feel, and continue to feel, a long-term ‘sense of duty’ towards the bank and its 
competitors with regards to the liquidity provision. The bid-ask spread is key to this 
mechanism and is, in practice, seen as a social norm or market convention, rather than 
a function of a hypothetical mid-price and various costs in a competitive environment. 
Hence, the determination of the FX swap bid-ask spread in practice seems more 
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consistent with the theoretical approach offered by Post-Keynesians (Carvalho, 1983-
1984; Harvey, 2009; Lawson, 1985).  
 
Even if banks or brokers do not explicitly communicate, a form of signalling 
automatically takes place through the submission of indicative prices such as LIBOR 
or bid-ask spreads in the FX swap market. Seen from this perspective, the 
harmonisation process depicted in the tables in Section 4 is more akin to a type of 
Keynesian Beauty Contest modelled by Stenfors (2014b) on the LIBOR fixing 
mechanism. Deviations of prices (or bid-ask spreads) from what could be regarded as 
their ‘fundamental value’ (the competitively determined equilibrium bid-ask spread) 
can be long lasting and also be surprisingly sticky as market participants incorporate 
the reputational effects of deviating from a particular financial market convention or 
social norm. This suggests that bid-ask spreads in the FX swap market might develop 
following some kind of convention, rather than overwhelmingly being a function of 
various costs. Spread clustering can be commonplace and persistent even in 
seemingly large, liquid and competitive markets. Only extremely sharp market 
movements seem to cause the conventions to break down. Even then, however, 
market makers gravitate towards a coordinated behaviour around a new spread: a new 
convention or norm. This, for instance, clearly appears to have been the case in the 
USD/NOK FX swap market during the turbulent years of 2007-08.  
 
As Harvey (2006, p. 781) points out, ‘individuals may participate in social norms in 
part because of an expectation that others will also participate’. This follows the 
definition by McAdams (1997) of a social norm as ‘informal social regularities that 
individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalised sense of duty, because 
of a fear of external nonlegal sanctions, or both’. The antitrust aspect comes into play 
when the social norm that benefits a few has an anticompetitive effect, and when 
communication between its participants enforces it. Empirically, the FX swap bid-ask 
spread determination process in this paper clearly contains symptoms of such anti-
competitive behaviour. The crucial question, however, is whether indicative quotes by 
banks and/or interdealer brokers in any way might benefit some and have harmful 
effects on others.  
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The articles by Christie and Schultz (1994ab) on NASDAQ stocks prompted a 
regulatory investigation and ultimately resulted in significant financial settlements. 
New rules requiring the display of customer limit orders were imposed, and previous 
rules governing the publication of quotations were amended in order to enhance 
pricing efficiency and competition (SEC, 1996). Transcripts from the investigations 
reveal that market makers generally treated the convention as a ‘pricing “ethic,” 
“tradition,” or “professional norm” that other market makers were expected to follow’ 
(US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996, p. 17). Some market makers 
testified that they had been trained by senior staff to follow this convention. 
Moreover, a failure to comply with the convention sometimes led to harassment or 
refusal to trade by other market makers. However, although the behaviour was seen as 
consistent with that of collusion, the outcome of the investigations by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice was not to refer to the 
convention as ‘an express agreement reached among all of the market makers in a 
smoke-filled room’. Instead, the process generating the bid-ask spreads was seen as a 
convention that ‘had anticompetitive consequences and was harmful to the interests of 
investors’ (ibid, p. 3). More recently, the European Commission (2014) fined a 
handful of market makers for agreeing ‘to quote to all third parties wider, fixed bid-
ask spreads on certain categories of short-term over-the-counter Swiss franc interest 
rate derivatives, whilst maintaining narrower spreads for trades amongst themselves’. 
The behaviour between RBS, UBS, JP Morgan and Crédit Suisse was classified as a 
cartel and Joaquín Almunia, Commission Vice-President in charge of competition 
policy, argued that ‘[…] the four banks agreed on an element of the price of certain 
financial derivatives. […] Cartels in the financial sector, whatever form they take, will 
not be tolerated’.  
 
Hence, the bid-ask spread is considered a ‘price component’ or ‘an element of a price’ 
under competition law. By regarding it as such, the spread can be seen as, say, a 
computer keyboard. Price-fixing of computers is illegal, and so is price-fixing of 
computer components such as keyboards. Whereas the market makers in the European 
Commission case decided to quote narrower bid-ask spreads to each other than to 
others, the creating of such a ‘two-tier’ market is not a prerequisite for it to be 
considered as price fixing conspiracy. Neither is it necessary for the behaviour to 
 34 
follow a formal agreement agreed upon in person, in writing, over the phone or via an 
electronic chat room.  
 
It is, of course, extremely difficult to assess what the prevailing ‘fair’ bid-ask spread 
should be for every instrument related to interest rates or FX at every moment in time. 
Different market makers use different methodologies, make different assessments and 
ultimately quote different prices and spreads. However, if they stand in competition 
with each other, market makers should not collude to agree upon a pre-defined bid-
ask spread. The spread, or the ‘price component’, should be determined 
competitively. Although the rule seems clear and similar in the two different cases 
above, the question is how and whether it is applicable to the hitherto largely 
unregulated FX market. According to the Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR, 
2015, p. 98), the message is clear: a new regulatory requirement is that ‘no distinction 
is made between wholesale and retail markets, or between fixed income, currency and 
commodity (FICC) and non-FICC markets’ with regards to UK and EU competition 
law. The report specifically stresses that it ‘also applies to financial markets, including 
FX spot, which may currently fall outside of the direct scope of financial market 
regulation’.  
 
Indeed, a class action has been filed in the US (New York Southern District Court, 
2015), where the claimants (end-users in the FX market) allege that the defendants 
(banks) have conspired to fix bid-ask spreads for various currency pairs in the FX spot 
market. Such collusive practises, it is argued, have acted to deprive end-users of 
active price competition, resulting in higher prices. Moreover, given that FX spot 
prices often are used as components in a range of other FX instruments, clients having 
entered into for instance FX forward or FX futures contracts would also have been 
harmed. In the OTC markets, different categories of market participants may face 
different bid-ask spreads (Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2005; Harris and Piwowar; 
2006; Green, Hollifield and Schürhoff, 2007). Thus, key elements of the alleged 
conspiracy above are the anti-competitive processes and the usage of market power 
among the market-making banks in the FX spot market. 
 
Paradoxically, however, the assumption (or, indeed, the regulatory requirement) that 
the bid-ask spread ought to be determined competitively in FICC markets at all times 
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seems at odds with the guidelines published by the ACI (The Financial Markets 
Association), which since 1955 has acted as the trade organisation for banks and 
central bank dealers in the FX and money markets around the world. The latest 
version of the ACI (2015, p. 103-104) Model Code, published in February 2015, 
states that ‘bilateral reciprocal dealing relationships are common in the OTC markets 
and often extend to unwritten understandings between Dealers to quote firm two-way 
dealing prices’. Further, the Model Code states that such informal reciprocal dealing 
relationships are to be ‘encouraged’ and are ‘a logical development in the OTC 
markets and play an important role in providing support and liquidity’. Hence, the 
trade organisation sees conventions, such as informal agreements regarding bid-ask 
spreads, as natural, logical and something that should be encouraged to maintain to 
maintain trust, reciprocality and liquidity in the marketplace. This approach is 
fundamentally different from the exchange-traded securities market and particularly 
relevant for OTC instruments that involve credit and/or liquidity risk. Problematically, 
the logic not only seems to encourage mutual understandings between competitors, it 
also seems to contradict the recent regulatory reform proposals and compliance 
changes aimed at radically restricting the ability of traders to communicate with each 
other. 
 
To illustrate this contradiction, and the relevance of indicative quotes, it is useful to 
refer to Stenfors’ (2014a) discovery how an informal rule change to the Norwegian 
Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) by six panel banks in 2008 not only came to change 
the decomposition of the benchmark but also increase the susceptibility of the 
benchmark to manipulation. Individual NIBOR quotes had traditionally been 
submitted following the covered interest rate parity, in other words using an implied 
NOK money market rate derived from the USD LIBOR and USD/NOK FX swaps. 
However, the NIBOR panel banks chose to change the convention of using the USD 
LIBOR (which was no longer perceived to reflect the actual USD funding cost of the 
banks) to indicative interdealer broker quotes. The impact of the rule change on 
NIBOR was substantial and thus harmful to a certain group of end-users. Although 
the governance structure of NIBOR has radically changed in the aftermath of the 
manipulation scandals (the regulation has moved from the panel banks themselves to 
Oslo Børs and Finans Norge), the submission methodology remains unchanged 
(Tafjord, 2015). An indicative interdealer broker screen is used for the USD money 
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market rate, and individual indicative USD/NOK FX swap prices are then used to 
derive an implied NOK money market rate (which becomes NIBOR). Moreover, as 
Stenfors (2014a, p. 455) points out, ‘a tighter bid-offer spread used for the USD/NOK 
FX swaps in the fixing mechanism would, ceteris paribus, result in a lower NIBOR. 
Measured in terms of basis points, the bid-offer spread is wider for shorter maturities, 
implying greater scope for deception for these maturities’. For instance, on every 
single day between 14 March 2008 and 15 September 2008, all three banks in this 
study submitted precisely the same 6-month USD/NOK swap bid-ask spread: 30 pips 
(equivalent to an average of 11.6 bps using the covered interest parity). The collapse 
of Lehman Brothers resulted in a widening of the spreads: up to 60 pips for DNB, up 
to 75 pips for DNB and up to 265 for SEB. Nonetheless, three months later, and 
throughout the period between 19 December 2008 and 15 June 2009, all three banks 
submitted precisely the same bid-ask spread again: this time 60 pips (equivalent to an 
average of 17.8 bps). Assuming the three banks had coordinated their spreads around, 
say, 45 instead of 60 pips (and ignoring the behaviour of any other banks), the daily 6-
month NIBOR had automatically fixed 1.5-2.25 bps lower throughout the period.5 In 
other words, the choice of the indicative bid-ask spread matters for the NIBOR fixing, 
which in turn determines the value of a range of derivatives instruments (such as 
interest rates swaps and forward rate agreements) and other financial contracts 
indirectly.  
 
A thorough calculation exercise aiming to estimate the harmful direct impact of 
collusive bid-ask spread matrices in the FX swap market is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, using data from BIS (2016), some indications can be obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 A shift from 60 to 45 pips is equivalent to 4.5 basis points. However, the highest and the lowest 
quotes out of six banks are omitted from the NIBOR fixing mechanism. 
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Table 15: Daily average turnover in the USD/JPY and USD/NOK FX swap and forward markets (USD 
mio, April) 
Currency pair  USD/JPY   USD/NOK  
FX swaps  396,132   32,292  
     With reporting dealers  228,781   14,770  
     With others  167,352   17,523  
     Up to 7 days  253,221   24,157  
     Over 7 days and up to 1 year  138,017   7,999  
     Over 1 year  4,894   136  
FX forwards  115,102   4,615  
     With reporting dealers  33,301   771  
     With others  81,801   3,844  
     Up to 7 days  54,051   1,812  
     Over 7 days and up to 1 year  60,079   2,721  
     Over 1 year  971   82  
Source: BIS (2016) 
 
If we exclude trades done between reporting dealers (which include the market 
making banks), assume a similar maturity distribution among the counterparty groups 
and use 3 months as a proxy for trades over 7 days and up to 1 year, we can get a 
rough estimation of the monetary impact of a recalibration of FX swap bid-ask 
spreads. According to the data in Table 15, one basis point would approximately 
represent $2,525,0006 daily in the USD/JPY FX swap and forward market and 
$165,000 daily in the USD/NOK FX swap and forward market. If collusive practices 
resulted in a mere 10% change of the average long-term 3-month bid-ask spread in the 
two markets (see Figure 1), the yearly impact would nonetheless be substantial: 
approximately $137 million7 and $50 million respectively. Thus, even though the 
average maturity is short (around three-quarters of the turnover consists of trades of 
less than one week), and the bid-ask spreads tight for major currency pairs, the impact 
of the sheer scale of the market can hardly be overestimated. With a total daily 
turnover of more than $3 trillion in the directly affected FX swap and FX forward 
markets, a recalibration of just one basis point would result in increased gains (for 
market makers) or losses (for end-users) amounting to billions of US dollars per year. 
Such recalibrations by market-making banks would, as the analysis shows, not 
necessarily be purely be determined by competitive processes, but also by the 
submitted bid-ask spreads as indicated by competing firms.  
 
In sum, the determination of bid-ask spreads in interest rate and FX swap markets 
tend to follow conventions. These conventions also include the usage of indicative 
prices and spreads from banks and interdealer brokers, which are central to the price 
                                                
6 [167,352*(138,017/396,132)+81,801*(60,079/115,102)]*$1,000,000/10000/4 = $2,525,000. 
7 $2,525,111*2.16 (average spread in basis points)*10%*252 (trading days per year) = $137,485,908. 
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discovery process and often serve as inputs for other benchmarks (or even become 
benchmarks themselves) in the absence of transaction data. Problematically, however, 
conventions in interest rate and FX swap markets fall back on trust and reciprocality – 
which is difficult to obtain without human communication. 
 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has investigated the drivers behind bid-ask spreads in the USD/JPY and 
USD/NOK FX swap markets. At the outset and over the long-run, the markets appear 
to be sufficiently large, stable and liquid, giving the impression that the bid-ask spread 
ought to be competitively determined – in line with traditional market microstructure 
theory. Following the empirical results from a screening methodology based upon 
Benford’s Law, on the other hand, an examination suggest that the bid-ask spread 
determination is characterised by fundamentally anti-competitive processes. As 
Stenfors and Lindo (2016) demonstrate, the large turnover (and tight bid-ask spreads) 
in the LIBOR-indexed derivatives market played an important role in sustaining an 
‘illusion’ that the underlying benchmark reflected a large, liquid and competitive 
Eurodollar market. The LIBOR came to appear as an objective and competitively 
determined price, which served to delay the discovery that it always had been 
susceptible to manipulation. Although there are fundamental differences between the 
FX swap market and LIBOR, there are also important similarities. Both are dominated 
by the activities of a homogenous group of players (large and global banks), and both 
have until recently largely managed to escape regulatory scrutiny. Both are also 
inherently linked to the money market and the unique interconnectedness of the 
banking system. Banks act as market makers of FX swaps, but can only provide 
liquidity as long as they are confident that other banks will also continue to do so. 
Theoretically, therefore, it seems like the classification between competitive and anti-
competitive bid-ask spreads in markets related to borrowing and lending, including 
FX swaps, might be too narrowly formulated. Crucially, it fails to capture the 
importance of conventions.  
 
A key response by regulators and policy makers in light of the recent findings of 
widespread misconduct in the largely unregulated OTC markets has been to seek to 
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establish some kind of ‘correctness’ in how important financial benchmarks are 
generated. The first set of reforms, or reform proposals, have been aimed at achieving 
greater ‘formalisation and professionalism’ (IBA, 2014, p. 3). For instance, the 
regulation and supervision of LIBOR have shifted from the LIBOR-panel banks 
themselves and the British Bankers Association to the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority. LIBOR-manipulation has been made a criminal offence, and a specific 
Code of Conduct (‘the LIBOR Code’) sets out practice standards that LIBOR panel 
banks are expected to follow. These changes follow a string of fines imposed on 
banks that have been found having manipulated, or attempted to manipulate, the 
benchmark. All in all, these set of measures strive to eliminate, or at least greatly 
reduce, the incentives of benchmark-manipulation. The second set of reforms has 
been aimed at making benchmarks more ‘market-like’. For instance, the window for 
calculating the WM/Reuters 4 pm London Closing Spot Rate, a widely used FX 
benchmark, has been widened from 1 to 5 minutes to include more trade and order 
data (FEMR, 2015). Although many interest rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR, are not 
based upon actual transactions, such data shall be used ‘if available and appropriate’ 
(European Council, 2105, p. 79). However, acknowledging that the underlying market 
might, at times, be illiquid or even non-existent, provisions have been made allowing 
LIBOR-banks to use their ‘expert judgement’ when submitting quotes during periods 
of ‘market turmoil and inactivity when inter-bank offers are absent’ (IBA, 2014, p. 
12).  
 
The reaction by the banks themselves is echoed by a statement by UBS Chairman 
Weber and CEO Ermotti from May 2015 (in reaction to the bank being fined by 
regulators for its involvement in the FX manipulation scandal): ‘The conduct of a 
small number of employees was unacceptable and we have taken appropriate 
disciplinary actions. We made significant investments to strengthen our control 
framework and compliance programs. We self-detected this matter and reported it to 
the US Department of Justice and other authorities. Our actions demonstrate our 
determination to pursue a policy of zero tolerance for misconduct and a desire to 
promote the right culture in our industry’ (Business Wire, 2015). Following the 
revelations of widespread manipulative and collusive practices, banks have imposed 
firmer Chinese Walls on their trading floors (particularly with regards to the 
benchmark submission process) and substantially increased the number of compliance 
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officers to monitor traders’ activities. Numerous dealing room conventions have been 
banned or become subject to strict internal oversight (such as the usage of mobile 
phones and multi-bank electronic chat rooms) with the intent to limit the possibilities 
of improper communication between traders and their competitors, interdealer brokers 
and clients (see, for instance, Verlaine and Finch, 2014; Martin and Stafford, 2015; 
Finch, Detrixhe and Choudhury, 2016). Thus, an underlying assumption is that traders 
in these markets often have had the means, opportunities and incentives to act anti-
competitively. By eliminating, reducing and monitoring various forms of 
communication, end-users in the market can be reassured that prices are determined 
competitively.  
 
Thus, the findings in this paper illustrate a challenge in light of recent changes in 
regulation and compliance aimed at eliminating, reducing or monitoring 
communication between traders at banks that ought to compete with each other. What 
banks and central banks could interpret as logical and necessary conventions to 
maintain market liquidity; lawyers, regulators and antitrust authorities might regard as 
collusive practices to extract rents – ultimately having harmful effects on end-users in 
the global FX market. 
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